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LEGISLATION AS A CRITICAL TOOL IN ADDRESSING SOCIAL CHANGE IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FROM MAYELANE v NGWENYAMA 
RN Ozoemena 
1  Introduction 
Since 1996 the Constitution1 has been the key driver of social change in South Africa 
in addressing the multifarious imbalances of the past. As South Africa is a 
constitutional democracy, one of the avenues for promoting the values of equality, 
dignity and freedom2 enshrined in the constitution is through the enactment of 
legislation. In terms of the Constitution, section 211(3) provides for the "application 
of customary law by the courts where it is applicable, subject to the constitution and 
any other legislation that specifically deals with customary law". One of the pieces of 
legislation enacted in this regard is the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
(hereinafter "the Recognition Act").3 Since the Recognition Act came into force in 
November 2000, it has brought both legal and social changes to the institution of 
marriage, particularly for African people. For instance, prior to 1994 customary 
marriages were not recognised by the South African state as legally valid, but they are 
now so recognised. Furthermore, the Recognition Act sought to ensure that the parties 
to a customary marriage enjoy equality of status within the marriage.4 Although the 
Recognition Act was intended to bring some form of certainty to the application of 
customary law, determining the content of the "living law" remains a challenge.5  
The transformative project of creating an egalitarian society based on human dignity 
and freedom has been driven in the main by the Constitution as well as by legislation 
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1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
2  Section 1(a) of the Constitution provide for the values on which the sovereign democratic state is 
founded, such as human dignity, the advancement of equality, human rights and freedoms. 
3  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (the Recognition Act). 
4  Mqeke 1999 Obiter 52; Dlamini 1999 Obiter 14. 
5  Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 306-341. 
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such as the Recognition Act. That project presupposes the existence of a culture of 
rights in advancing social change. In many ways, the Constitution has made a tangible 
impact on the lives of many, as noted in cases such as Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld 
Community6 and Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha.7. In other ways, the specific legislation 
relating to customary law seems to have had the opposite effect and to have had 
unintended consequences for the majority of the people. In the Mayelane v 
Ngweyama8 ("Mayelane") case, one of the issues concerned the application of the 
provisions of the Recognition Act, particularly concerning the requirements for the 
validity of customary marriages in the context of polygyny. The provisions in the 
Recognition Act intended to protect the parties in a polygynous marriage failed to take 
into account the realities of South African family relationships resulting from job 
migration to the cities by the husbands of many women married in terms of customary 
law. The unintended consequences of such migration as found in the Mayelane case 
and the application of the Recognition Act in the context of polygynous marriages, are 
that a lot of women are left unprotected, with a far-reaching effect on them and their 
children. This further highlighted the difficulty of ascertaining the true content of 
Xitsonga customary law. 
In a constitutional democracy such as ours, how should living law be developed and 
what are the mechanisms that are best placed to do so? The purpose of this article is 
to draw attention to the inefficacy of legislation particularly in the context of African 
customary practices, whose nature is fluid and changes constantly with the socio-
economic conditions of the people. Although the changing nature of living customary 
law may present challenges in ascertaining its content, change is intrinsic to this law. 
Hence the need for case by case development. This article argues that the notion of 
living law presupposes change, and that the use of legislation in certain areas of 
customary law may result in unintended consequences that will adversely affect the 
people it seeks to benefit. It is submitted that the Constitutional Court needs to engage 
                                        
6  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC). 
7  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). 
8  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) (hereafter Mayelane). 
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more with social norms in the community in order to adequately address the nuances 
that form part of the evolving nature of customary law. 
2  Facts 
The applicant, Mayelane, married Mr Hlengani Dyson Moyana in 1984 at the time when 
customary marriages were referred to as "customary unions".9 Ngwenyama alleges 
that she also married Mr Moyana on 26 January 2008, after the coming into force of 
the Recognition Act. Mr Moyana died a little more than a year later, on the 28 February 
2009. The Recognition Act converted "customary unions" that were valid and existed 
at the time of the commencement of the Act into customary marriages recognised by 
law. After the death of Mr Moyana, both Mayelane and Ngwenyama sought to register 
their marriages in terms of section 4 of the Recognition Act. Each disputed the other's 
marriage, and Mayelane then applied to the High Court to have her customary 
marriage declared valid and that of Ngwenyama to be declared invalid on the basis 
that she as the first wife had not consented to the marriage. The High Court granted 
both orders. 
The matter went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), which confirmed 
the validity of Mayelane's marriage but overturned the order of invalidity regarding 
the marriage of Ngwenyama. The SCA also found both marriages to be valid under 
customary law. The matter before the Constitutional Court was the appeal against the 
decision of the SCA in which the applicant, Mayelane, alleged that in terms of Xitsonga 
customary law the consent of the first wife is required before any other subsequent 
customary marriage can be entered into by her husband and that she did not consent 
to such a marriage. In terms of section 3(1) of the Recognition Act dealing with the 
requirements for the validity of the marriage, consent relates only to the parties to the 
marriage, and nowhere does the Act refer to the consent of the first wife. In 
determining the matter, the Constitutional Court decided to engage with the question 
of whether the consent of an existing wife in a customary marriage is required for the 
validity of her husband's subsequent polygynous customary marriages. They 
                                        
9  Bakker and Heaton 2012 TSAR 586-593. 
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embarked on this enquiry by looking in the first place at the provisions in the 
Recognition Act and, in the second place, to the Xitsonga customary law to which the 
parties subscribe. 
3  The judgement 
The main judgment of the Constitutional Court in the Mayelane case dealt with two 
related issues: the consent of an existing wife to the validity of her husband's 
subsequent customary marriage and the content of the applicable customary rule, 
including how it should be ascertained. The Court considered the consent issue by 
having regard to the values and rights enshrined in the Constitution, such as equality10 
and human dignity.11 The common view is that African customs and practices infringe 
on the equality rights of women, denying them equal status in marriage, inheritance 
and succession. The Constitutional Court in a number of cases has sought to provide 
much needed redress to women where inequalities have been found to exist, as in 
Bhe (where the customary practice of male primogeniture was declared 
unconstitutional for violating the right to equality), Shilubana (the succession of a 
woman as Hosi-chief - was confirmed, thereby protecting right to gender equality) 
and Gumede (where the equal rights of women in marriage was protected).12 In 
dealing with the consent issue in Mayelane, the Court first of all considered the 
recognition and application of customary law under the Constitution in general and, in 
particular, in relation to the Recognition Act. The Court utilised the tripartite scheme 
of statutory, constitutional and living law and, based on its interpretation of the 
applicable legislation, it sought to develop the Xitsonga customary law with a view to 
bringing it in line with the ethos of the Constitution.  
The Court began by recognising the importance of customary law as an independent 
source of law that must be accorded its rightful place in the broad scheme of the 
South African legal system. The Court also recognised that the Recognition Act is 
premised on the notion that customary law that can be harmonised with the values of 
                                        
10  Section 9 of the Constitution. 
11  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
12  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC); Gumede v President of Republic of South Africa 2009 
3 SA 152 (CC). 
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dignity and equality in the Constitution. So, in determining whether the consent of an 
existing wife in a subsisting customary marriage is necessary, the Court looked to 
relevant provisions in the Recognition Act.13 Section 3(1) of the Recognition Act deals 
with the requirements for the validity of a customary marriage by stipulating that (a) 
the parties to the marriage must give their consent and (b) the marriage must be 
"negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law". It was, 
however, placed on affidavit by the brother to the deceased that none of his siblings 
went to negotiate lobolo and there was no ceremony in relation to marriage between 
his brother and the respondent. Furthermore, the respondent could not adduce 
evidence to the existence of any marriage, and so the Court held that the respondent 
could not prove the existence of a marriage between herself and the deceased 
according to customary law. The Court further considered section 7(6) of the 
Recognition Act, which specifically provides that a husband must approach the court 
for an order regarding the matrimonial regime. The Court held that this provision could 
not be interpreted to determine consent of the first wife. The main judgment 
considered it necessary to require further evidence from witnesses to determine what 
the "living law" of the Xitsonga people was. From the evidence gathered from a wide 
range of witnesses and experts, it was clear to the Court that: 
(a) Polygynous marriages are not the norm in Xitsonga society, however, 
VaTsonga men have a choice to enter into further customary marriages; 
(b) VaTsonga men when they do decide, must inform their first wife of the 
intention to take another wife; 
(c) It is expected that the first wife agree and assist in the process leading to the 
further marriage; 
(d) If there are disagreements regarding the first wife's consent, the families are 
brought in to persuade and where it fails, divorce may occur.14 
 The Court deduced that the living law of the Xitsonga requires that the first wife be 
informed of her husband's impending subsequent marriage. The wide range of 
evidence gathered was considered by the majority as a means of ascertaining as well 
as noting the nuances in the Xitsonga customary law. Hence the importance of 
developing the law to make consent a requirement for a subsequent customary 
marriage. It was on this point of ascertaining the relevant customary law that the 
                                        
13  Mayelane paras 36-38. 
14  Mayelane para 61. 
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dissenting judgment arose. Zondo J was of the view that the respondent could not 
discharge the onus of proving that marriage of any kind existed between her and the 
deceased when he died.15 In his view, the requirements of section 3(1)(b) had not 
been met, and so the marriage was invalid as it did not comply with the "customs and 
usages that are traditionally observed among the Vatsonga which form part of their 
culture". According to him it was therefore not necessary to develop Xitsonga 
customary law as the majority did, because in terms of that law the husband intending 
to enter into a second customary marriage must inform the first wife and she must 
consent to it.16 Jafta J also dissented on the grounds that it was inappropriate for the 
Constitutional Court to be the court of first and last instance on the matter of whether 
the consent of an existing wife in a customary marriage is required, where the matter 
had not even been raised in the court a quo. He concluded that the development of 
Xitsonga customary law in the main judgment was inappropriate, because it had not 
been canvassed by the parties and there were no exceptional circumstances 
warranting a departure from the precedent laid down in Lane and Fey v Dabelstein17 
and Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd.18 In both of 
these cases the Constitutional Court refrained from the development of common law 
rules, which restraint, by reason of parity, Jafta claimed, should also apply to 
customary law.19 The dissenting judgments in Mayelane were convinced that the same 
outcome would have been reached without the development of Xitsonga customary 
law. The majority judgment in this case decided to develop the customary law of the 
Vatsonga with wider implications for the future of polygynous marriages in the 
community and, by parity of reasoning, the country as a whole. Their approach brings 
into sharp focus the extent of the reach of the transformative agenda of creating a 
new order. In this instance the court shifted from the application of the Recognition 
Act to the development of Xitsonga customary law. The Constitutional Court is obliged 
to develop customary law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides 
that: 
                                        
15  Per Zondo J in Mayelane para 108. 
16  Bekker and Rautenbach "Nature and Sphere of Application" 17-23. 
17  Lane and Fey v Dabelstei 2001 2 SA 1187 (CC). 
18  Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 (CC). 
19  Per Jafta in Mayelane para 150. 
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... when interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.20 
This section requires proper understanding of the connection that exists between the 
interpretation of legislation and the development of customary law. In Mayelane the 
Court employed both customary law and the applicable legislation in determining the 
role of consent of the first wife to the validity of the subsequent marriage of her 
husband to another woman. The outcome of this approach relied on by the Court was 
indicative of legislation that was trailing behind the living law, and yet the living law 
was developed. This is a classic example of a change in law devoid of any adequate 
engagement with the social norms of the community. 
4  Analysis 
4.1  Law, social change and living customary law 
Several debates have been going on regarding the relationship between law and social 
change.21 Social change refers to reforms, changes or transformation within a society 
that has a specific impact on the lives of the people and their institutions.22 Often 
times, the changing beliefs in social, political or even economic spheres in society have 
laid the basis for reforms in law, and in other instances the law takes the lead in laying 
the firm basis for changed morality. In practice, the interdependence between the two 
processes cannot be overlooked or underrated. One of the critical points to note is 
that usually the way a society functions does not rely on state rule. In other words, 
there are norms that influence and shape people's lives, social contracts that inform 
their sense of obligation towards one another and the proper sanctions for breaching 
these standards of behaviour, and they do not necessarily depend on state authority 
for their existence.23 So law must be looked at not in isolation or separate from society 
but must take into account the manner in which people live. Sally Falk Moore24 
suggests that law as a semi-autonomous field should be determined not in terms of 
                                        
20  Section 39(2) of Constitution. Emphasis added. 
21  Kok 2010 SALJ 66. 
22  Kok Socio-legal Analysis 34-110. 
23  Griffith 24 1986 1-55. 
24  Falk Moore Law as Process 7-8. 
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territorial boundaries but rather by its measure of influence and whether it can 
generate rules, customs and symbols that are sacrosanct to the people living within 
that field, whilst it can influence and also be influenced by rules and decisions coming 
from other sources. In my view, the suggestion of Falk Moore establishes that custom-
based rules that are meaningful to the people are largely influenced by their economic 
as well as their social conditions. 
Vander Zanden on his part defines social change as the "fundamental alterations in 
the patterns of cultural structures and patterns of behaviour over time".25 This implies 
that it takes time to develop custom-based norms because change occurs only over a 
period of time. This is the kind of approach that the majority judgment in Bhe rejected. 
Langa DCJ was of the view that the majority of South Africans have waited for so long 
for justice, equality and freedom that any further delay in bringing justice to the people 
is inappropriate. He said that: 
.. the problem with development by the courts on a case by case basis is that changes 
will be very slow; uncertainties regarding the real rules of customary law will be 
prolonged...26 
In this instance, the majority judgment made an immediate and significant change to 
the customary rule of male primogeniture. This decision was considered by many, 
including traditional leaders, to be judicial encroachment on customary practices.27 
When such views are expressed, this may indicate the ineffectiveness of judge-made 
rules or legislation on the lives of majority. Many have argued that most societal ills 
cannot be properly addressed by law because law has no role to play in effecting social 
change; rather, society changes and then law adapts to those changes.28 The notion 
of living customary law is predicated on this kind of premise rather than on the codified 
version that has been previously adopted by courts. 
The first substantive case that dealt with the notion of "living law" was the 
Constitutional Court case of Alexkor v Richtersveld Community,29 which dealt with 
                                        
25  Vander Zanden Social Experience 125. 
26  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 112.  
27  Himoga 2005 Acta Juridica 82.  
28  Kok 2010 SALJ 65. 
29  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC). 
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customary land rights. The broad principles enunciated in the case were that in the 
first place customary law is an independent source of law that must not be interpreted 
through the common law lens. Secondly, customary law is recognised to the extent 
that it is consistent with the Constitution and any applicable legislation. The third 
principle recognised customary law as the "living" law. The Court succinctly stated in 
Alexkor and reaffirmed in Bhe that: 
… it is important to note that indigenous law is not a fixed body of formally classified 
and easily ascertainable rules. By its very nature it evolves as the people who live by 
it its norms change their patterns of life … In applying indigenous law, it is important 
to bear in mind that, unlike common law, indigenous law is not written. It is a system 
of law that was known to the community, practiced and passed on from generation 
to generation. It is a system of law that its own values and norms. Throughout 
history, it has evolved and developed to meet the changing needs of the community. 
And it will continue to evolve within the context of its values and norms consistently 
with the Constitution.30 
The Court acknowledged the nature of customary law, including its fluidity and the 
difficulties involved in ascertaining its content. It was also acknowledged that the lives 
of the people who live according to its norms are critical to its evolution as a source 
of law, because of the constant changing patterns of their lives. This was an 
acknowledgement of the importance of social norms and the influence of such values 
on the living law of the people. It was also found necessary at this point to 
acknowledge the limits of state law, including legislation, in addressing issues of 
customary law. Clearly, it is not that law does not drive social change, but one also 
has to affirm that there are greater influences in other social fields at play, such as 
family, tribe, religious and social affiliations.31 
Having regard to the South African context, living customary law is in competition with 
state law, while being shaped by it. Living customary law has powerfully guided the 
behaviour of a significant portion of the country's population for a long time, and 
therefore should then be viewed as semi-autonomous, because the ties that bind its 
observers together are stronger than the ties that bind them to external factors such 
as state legislation. 
                                        
30  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) paras 48, 81; Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld 
Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) paras 52-54. 
31  Kok 2010 SALJ 59. 
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Sometimes attempts are made by government to re-regulate these "semi-autonomous 
fields", which already have their own rules, practices and customs, by imposing new 
legislation on them. Legislative interventions, however, often fail because of the pre-
existing social arrangements which are considered more important and stronger by 
society than the new legislation.32 In South Africa, pieces of legislation such as the 
Communal Land Rights Act33 and the Traditional Courts Bill34 have fallen into this 
category of "imposed law".35 It can be argued in the South African context that the 
desire to make right the wrong done by the historical legacy of apartheid has 
contributed to these legislative interventions. For example, the Recognition Act 
requires spouses to a customary marriage to register their marriages to ensure that 
both spouses have equal rights in the marriage. Often the practical application of the 
piece of legislation poses numerous challenges with unintended consequences. For 
example, the Recognition Act requires that marriages be registered and yet it does 
not invalidate unregistered marriages. Notwithstanding the lack of sanction for non-
registration, a woman without the certificate of registration risks her benefits, if any, 
from the marriage.36  
In the Mayelane case, both the applicant and the respondent had not registered their 
marriages as required by the Recognition Act, and yet the respondent bore the greater 
burden. Prima facie, both parties to the case seem to be placed on the same footing 
by the Recognition Act in that they had not registered their marriages, and hence had 
not complied with the requirements of the Act. The proof of the validity of the marriage 
was not properly addressed by the Court. Instead the Court focused on the consent 
of the existing wife and her constitutional right to equality within the marriage to the 
detriment of the respondent. The validity of the second marriage was not determinable 
according to the Court, even though the deceased had took some guests to his home 
as some kind of introduction process, and not specifically for lobolo negotiation.37 The 
                                        
32  Kok Socio-legal Analysis 66. 
33  Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004. 
34  Traditional Courts Bill, first introduced into Parliament in 2008. It was withdrawn in 2009 and was 
re-introduced in 2011. Both the Communal Land Rights Act and the Traditional Courts Bill have 
been depicted as recreating apartheid structures. 
35  Mnisi-Weeks "Traditional Courts Bill". 
36  De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica 239-272. 
37  Mayelane para 105. 
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Court considered this to be a mere gesture of friendship rather than a marriage, given 
that the respondent was a woman with five children from a previous marriage. This 
was the outcome of applying the Recognition Act in the specific context of polygynous 
relationship without taking all the ramifications into account. A proper and careful 
balance needs to be applied where state rules and custom-based rules co-exist. 
In Mayelane, the Court reiterated some principles regarding the status of customary 
law within the South African legal system. It affirmed that "…customary law feeds 
into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam of South African law".38 
Against this background it was pertinent to properly establish the content of Xitsonga 
customary law as a "matter of law", and the majority judgement sought to do so by 
directing that further evidence be provided by a number of people with knowledge 
regarding Xitsonga customary law. The fact that this evidence was contradictory did 
not deter the Court, which instead viewed the contradictions as providing nuance and 
perspectives often missed in such cases. 
The majority then took an entirely fresh step in an attempt to develop Xitsonga 
customary law by making consent a requirement for subsequent customary marriage. 
In their view, where a husband decided to marry again without the consent of an 
existing wife, such a move was considered by the Court as being incompatible with 
the right of an existing wife to equality and dignity. The implication of the development 
was that consent had now to be uniformly applied in all Xitsonga communities. The 
two dissenting judgments of Zondo J and Jafta J (with Mogoeng CJ and Nkabinde J 
concurring) were insightful in suggesting the manner in which customary law should 
be developed. The view of Zondo was that there was sufficient evidence regarding the 
issue of consent in Xitsonga customary law. According to him, there were two 
objectives to be determined in this case. In the first instance, customary marriage 
depends on 
... whether the customs and usages traditionally observed among the Vatsonga and 
which form part of the culture of the Vatsonga have been followed, which requires 
that the consent of the first wife be obtained when a further customary marriage is 
                                        
38  Mayelane para 23. 
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entered into. Secondly, whether such marriage was 'negotiated and entered into or 
celebrated' according to customary law.39 
From this standpoint, what should have been considered was what was traditionally 
observed by that particular community. It was clear that the customs and usages of 
the Vatsonga required that the first wife be informed of the marriage and, as she 
alleged, she was not informed. On this basis alone, the subsequent marriage to the 
respondent should be invalid. Instead, the majority judgment failed to take into 
account the evidence of the deceased's brother as being authentic evidence of the 
customs and usages of the Vatsonga people and went ahead to develop the law. It 
can be deduced from this approach of the majority that the depth of knowledge of the 
family regarding their law was insufficient, and so the judge-made rule took 
precedence over what the people who own the law said regarding their law. 
The approach of the dissenting judgment in my view is preferable with regards to the 
development of customary law as being unnecessary in this instance. In the first place, 
customary marriages are not entered into secretly but are usually organised and 
planned with a lot of family gatherings orchestrated to such an extent that the 
community must know that a man is now connected to the woman's family by 
marriage. So, based on the nature of customary marriages in the community, the first 
respondent failed to show that any marriage took place between her and Mr Moyana, 
the deceased. In the second instance, Xitsonga customary law is progressive already 
in that it requires that the first wife be informed and a failure to inform her would 
render such a marriage invalid. Thirdly, the Court failed to provide clarity regarding 
the nature of the consent before developing the Xitsonga customary law. The various 
scenarios at play should have been taken into account, particularly as this was a 
polygynous marriage. For example, there was neither the floor (the threshold of 
consent) nor the ceiling (should the consent be express or tacit)? Clearly, the decision 
of the majority in Mayelane raised more questions than answers regarding consent, 
and there is no doubt that customary law should be developed. It should, however, 
be borne in mind that when the Constitution guaranteed the continued existence of 
and survival of an "evolving" customary law, it intended that the manner in which 
                                        
39  Mayelane para 103. 
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customary law should develop should be best left to future social progression and not 
development at all costs. 
The development of customary law by the Court is mandated by section 39(2) of the 
Constitution. According to the provision: 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. 
In the context of Mayelane, the adjudication on the validity of a second customary 
marriage required the Court to strike a balance between customary law and the 
Recognition Act. The importance of such an approach is underscored by the nature of 
living customary law, which allows for the negotiation of customs and practices by the 
people to best suit their daily lives. 
In Bhe, Ngcobo J referred to two contexts in which the need to develop customary 
law might arise, as noted by the Constitutional Court in Carmichele.40 The first was 
where customary law needs to be adapted to changed circumstances, as was the 
situation in Shilubana, where the traditional authority of the Valoyi tribe gave effect 
to the nature of living customary law by deciding that the daughter of their late hosi, 
Fofoza, should now be named as hosi, a position that was denied her due to the 
practice of male primogeniture at the time her father passed away. The second was 
to bring it in line with the Bill of Rights. This was also evident in the Mabena case,41 
where the court developed the customary rule that it is not only men who are able to 
be involved in lobolo negotiations. This development of the practice was based on the 
changing nature of composition of a family in South Africa, where women are now 
also heads of households. The insistence that a mother who stood as the head of the 
household could not partake in the lobolo negotiation because of her gender was held 
to be inconsistent with the Constitution. In this circumstance, the living law played a 
significant role in bringing that particular customary rule in line with the Constitution. 
                                        
40  Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 33; Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 212. 
41  Mabena v Lestalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
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Critical principles to bear in mind when developing customary law, as enunciated by 
Van der Westhuizen J in Shilubana and reiterated in Mayelane, were: 
(a) consideration of the traditions of the community concerned; 
(b) the right of communities that observe systems of customary law to develop 
their law; 
(c) the need for flexibility and development must be balanced against the value 
of legal certainty, respect for vested rights and the protection of constitutional 
rights; and 
(d) while development of customary law by courts is distinct from its development 
by a customary community, the courts when engaged with the adjudication 
of a customary-law matter, must remain mindful of their obligations under 
section 39(2) of the Constitution to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.42 
The majority in Mayelane seemed to have understood this framework when it 
considered customary law, the Recognition Act and the Xitsonga customary law and 
the distinction that it made regarding the differences between development by the 
court and development by the communities. It must be acknowledged that the 
Recognition Act does not provide any relevant guidelines regarding the consent of the 
first wife. Instead, it presented a lot of difficulties in its practical application to the 
living conditions of many women in South Africa. The Recognition Act thus fails to 
adequately cover critical areas regarding polygynous relationships, even though it 
provides partial protection for the matrimonial regime of parties to polygynous 
marriage. The Court, on its part, focused solely on its obligation in terms of section 
39(2) when it said that: 
This Court has accepted that the constitution's recognition of customary law 
as a legal system that lives side-by side with common law and legislation 
requires innovation in determining its "living" content, as opposed to the 
potentially stultified version contained in past legislation and court precedent. 
However, to date, this Court has not engaged in an incremental development 
of customary law as contemplated by section 39(2) of the Constitution. In 
Bhe, the Court invalidated the customary rule of succession regarding male 
primogeniture and, by a majority, replaced that rule with the statutory regime 
regarding intestate succession then applicable to non-adherents of customary 
law. Gumede involved confirmation proceedings relating to the invalidity of 
legislation. Shilubana gave recognition to and accepted the development of 
customary law already undertaken by traditional authorities.43 
                                        
42  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC) para 44-49; Mayelane para 45. 
43  Mayelane para 43. 
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The above paragraph clearly refers to some of the approaches adopted by the 
Constitutional Court in developing customary law. Although the majority judgment 
was able to state all the principles that support the transformation agenda, in my view 
their inability to contextualise the values relevant to the community in connection with 
the specific legislation governing customary law fell short of the desired outcome. For 
example, it recognised that the requirement of consent in customary marriages should 
not be given a meaning that does not reflect its nature in customary law, and yet, in 
its decision, consent in the Xitsonga community was generally applied to the extent 
that it might have implications for other communities. This will have a greater impact 
where customary practices are developed on a case by case basis. 
4.2  Polygyny in South Africa and the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act 
The practice of polygyny in African culture generally is not new. Polygyny is a well-
entrenched practice of African people, and is recognised under customary law. African 
regional human rights instruments such as the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa also recognise that 
polygyny is well and alive in many communities on the African continent, regardless 
of social status.44 For example, the Southern Africa Development Community boasts 
of two heads of government that practice polygyny.45 Polygyny as a custom is derived 
from customary law, which is recognised by the Constitution as a system of law in 
South Africa in terms of section 211(3) of the Constitution. It follows, therefore, that 
polygyny is protected in our law to the extent that it is consistent with the Bill of Rights 
and for obvious reasons, the Court found that the practice need not necessarily in and 
of itself violate constitutional rights. But it has the potential to do so and regulation is 
required to ensure the protection of the equality of status and dignity of women in 
polygynous marriages.46 For example, it is common practice in South African society 
that many men leave the wives whom they married under customary law in the rural 
                                        
44  Article 6(c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (2000).  
45  Gender Links 2013 http://www.genderlinks.org.za/article/womens-rights-and-polygamy-2013-04-
08. 
46  Mayelane paras 20-21; Andrews 2009 Utah L Rev 351-379. 
RN OZOEMENA   PER / PELJ 2015(18)4 
 
985 
villages and move to the cities in search of work. A lot of men in that situation then 
enter into some form of marriage with another woman in the city, creating double 
family situations. The majority of rural women are unaware that their husbands have 
entered into a marriage with another woman.47 It is usually on the death of the 
husband or when a dispute arises that these changes in family situations come to 
light, and this does not usually bode well for the women involved. In the Mayelane 
case, rather than offering protection, the Recognition Act complicated the situation. 
The effect of this conflict of systems is that the court battles to balance the competing 
rights in attempting to take into account the dignity and equal rights of all the women 
involved. 
The Recognition Act implicitly recognises polygyny and in terms of section 7(6) 
provides that a husband who wishes to enter into a further customary marriage with 
another woman must make an application to the court to approve a written contract 
which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriage, but it is 
the husband who must make written application. Most times they fail to do so, to the 
detriment of the women in the marriage. The failure in this case by Mr Moyana resulted 
in the non-registration as well as non-recognition of his subsequent marriage to 
Ngwenyama in terms of the law.48 The fact that the deceased, Moyana, spent the last 
year of his life with the respondent did not ameliorate her position, and so she bore 
the adverse effects of the law, even though the Recognition Act clearly stipulates that 
a failure to register the marriages does not result in its invalidity. It is submitted that 
the peculiar situation regarding double families in South Africa was not sufficiently 
considered in the Mayelane case, and the court did not apply its mind to this trend 
and consider the adverse effect its decision would have on many women like 
Ngwenyama, whose rights to equality and dignity are not being taken in to account. 
  
                                        
47  De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica 246. 
48  Rautenbach and Du Plessiss 2012 McGill LJ 749, where the authors examine the literal approach 
of the Court in dealing with African customary marriages. 
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4.3  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998: some 
reflections on its role in a changing society 
The Recognition Act was enacted to bring a much needed remedy to the injustices 
faced by the majority of South African women, and twenty years into our democracy 
it has become clear that the nature of living customary law is being contradicted by 
the Recognition Act. For example, the Court in Gumede49 declared invalid a provision 
of the Recognition Act for being inconsistent with the constitutional rights of human 
dignity and equality. 
Although, the Recognition Act is a welcome relief for the majority of women, 
particularly those who are in polygynous marriages, it is inadequate to deal with the 
dynamics and flexibility of customary law. For example, many women have yet to 
register their marriages, and failure to register the marriage results in failure to be in 
possession of certificate of marriage. Clearly, such requirements are not found in living 
customary law, and yet the Department of Home Affairs makes this mandatory 
certificate a requirement for receiving the entitlements and benefits of the marriage.50 
Often it is the "urban" wife that is in possession of the certificate and then lays claim 
to the benefits of the marriage, to the detriment of the rural customary law wife who 
had been married to the man for a long time. So, without the prima facie proof located 
in the certificate of marriage, many women face numerous legal as well as social 
disadvantages that adversely impact on the family.51  
Furthermore, the Department of Home Affairs charged with the registration of these 
marriages has to work with the Recognition Act; the original and the amended 
version.52 Section 4(9) of the Recognition Act states that non-registration does not 
result in invalidity, yet the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act in section 5(1) provides further stringent processes required for 
the registration of marriages, particularly where there is a dispute between the 
                                        
49  Gumede v President of Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC). 
50  Mwabene and Kruuse 2013 Acta Juridica 292-317. 
51  De Souza 2013 Acta Juridica 239.  
52  The Recognition Act was amended in 2009. Also, the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 came into operation in the same year. 
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parties.53 In addition, the Department of Home Affairs has to prevent the registration 
of fraudulent marriages. It is mainly women who allegedly make these claims, and the 
suspicions are deep-rooted, leading to lots of complex processes that ordinary folks 
cannot deal with. Simply put, a customary marriage becomes meaningless and 
unrecognised without the proof of marriage which is located in the certification of 
registration, an approach that was adopted by the Provincial Court in Baadjies v 
Matebula.54 Also, aspects of these social changes in family relations have culminated 
in a position where the Recognition Act has become too specific in some areas and 
too vague in others. For example, section 4(4)(a) makes mention of "any lobolo agreed 
to", which has led to several cases on exactly at what point a customary marriage was 
entered into, as noted in Nthenjani,55 or part payment was made as found in 
Motsoatsoa v Roro,56 or the lobolo was paid in full, as held in Fanti v Boro.57 
In my view, the Recognition Act has failed to alter social practice in such a manner as 
to engender the protection of human rights. It purports to protect the rights of women 
but then creates huge challenges that are contrary to the set objectives of the Act. 
The Constitutional Court, on its part, has not provided guidance, since it condoned the 
non-registration of the marriages in Mayelane. I argue further that there are limits to 
what the law can achieve, particularly in the area of customary law, and in this 
instance a number of laws, pieces of legislation or regulations that are subject to the 
Constitution may be outdated in the context of the way in which people live their lives, 
and are hence bound to lose their efficacy.58 This is indicative of the limited role that 
law plays in causing positive societal change. It also suggests that legislation may be 
out of sync with the realities of the society. This thought echoes what Cotterrell argued 
when he said that "state-enforced sanctions appear to be useless in many areas of 
social life and tend to disrupt rather than harmonise social relations".59 Clearly, in 
relation to the "grand social transformation" envisaged by the Recognition Act, women 
                                        
53  Meyer 2012 http://www.lawlibrary.co.za/2012/03/justicecollege_recognitionofcustomary 
marriages.pdf 1-33. 
54  Baadjies v Matebula 2002 3 SA 427 (W). 
55  Nthanjeni v Road Accident Fund 2011 ZAFHC 196. 
56  Motsoatsoa v Roro 2011 2 All SA 324 (GSJ). 
57  Fanti v Boro 2008 5 SA 405 (C). 
58  Claassens and Smythe 2013 Acta Juridica 4. 
59  Cotterrell Sociology of Law 52. 
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have not benefitted much, and are instead confronted with huge complications arising 
from the its application. 
5  Conclusion 
The purpose of the Recognition Act is to remedy the injustices of the past in relation 
to customary marriages, but it is evident that there is a huge disparity between the 
Recognition Act as a piece of legislation and how it is implemented for the benefit of 
the majority of the people. Hence, the value of the Recognition Act as a tool for societal 
transformation is questionable. At the heart of the Mayelane case is the issue of how 
society should internalise the legal framework that promises equal rights and translate 
it into a human rights culture. Thus far, the approach of the Constitutional Court 
towards its obligation to develop customary law indicates a lack of proper 
understanding of when it should or should not intervene. It is now twenty years into 
our constitutional democracy, and hence there is a need to recognise the value implicit 
in the transformational agenda of our law and society. To this end, it is pertinent to 
recognise that there are limits to the law, particularly in the context of customary law, 
where there are different variations of the same rule. Evidently, the Court still needs 
to balance competing interests relating to its obligations and the possible impact of its 
decisions, particularly in connection with the Recognition Act. Currently, it has utilised 
two known mechanisms in relation to the development of customary law rules, which 
are striking down impugned legislation and incremental development. In Mayelane it 
embarked on the incremental development of a law and practice that are already part 
of the lives of the people. The requirement of consent is now the law among the 
Xitsonga, and how this will be internalised by the community remains to be seen. 
Usually, rules that people consider an imposition are largely ignored. In my view, the 
Constitutional Court must begin to decipher African law and justice, and they can do 
so by taking into account section 211(2) through referring matters back to the 
communities prior to attempting to develop living customary law. 
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